Is Russia an “enemy”?

The NYT posted an intriguing opinion piece by Nicholas Kristof this week, comparing the Trump-Russia controversy with the controversy over revelations that President Nixon tried to sabotage diplomatic efforts to end the Vietnam War.  Kristof explores the Trump campaign’s Russia connections, conceding that no smoking gun yet exists but piling up the circumstantial evidence as he makes the case for a robust investigation.  He asks, straightforwardly: “Was there treason?”  He ends by quoting historian Douglas Brinkley, who recently said, “There’s a smell of treason in the air.”

Let’s concede that the matter is still wide open, and that no direct evidence of criminality or collusion has yet been made public, if it exists.  But let us take the theory in its current incarnation: operatives associated with the Trump campaign, the theory goes, may have colluded with Russian operatives to obtain and disseminate information about Hillary Clinton that would weaken her candidacy and strengthen Trump’s chances of winning (or, to be more precise, strengthen Clinton’s chances of losing, which is what Russia really wanted).  This may have been done on Trump’s own orders, or with his knowledge (or, at a minimum, his willful blindness).  It may have even involved complicity in broader Russian efforts to affect our political system.  In other words, this theory of the case goes, the Trump campaign may have colluded with agents of an adversarial foreign power to win an election and assist that foreign power in getting the result it desired.

If this theory — and it is as yet only conjecture — plays out as true, then Kristof’s question is a compelling one.  Is this treason?  I have written before that treason is an oft-used epithet, often describing conduct that is serious and compromises American security or values in some way, but is not — legally speaking — treasonous.  Recall that Article III of the Constitution tells us that American treason consists only of levying war against the United States, or adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort.  Although one can argue about the ways in which modern warfare has changed, as a matter of original understanding of the Constitution, I think it unlikely that we would say this kind of collusion constitutes “levying war.”  The only other option then, is what I have called “Adherence Treason,” the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy, with the intent to betray the United States.

Let’s assume, purely hypothetically, that Trump, or someone from his team, provided assistance to the Russians in their efforts to influence the presidential campaign.  And let us assume that they did so with the intent to betray the United States, presumably by undermining the processes of American democracy to the benefit of a private individual (Trump) and of the Russian government, whose leadership despised Clinton and did not want Clinton to win the presidency.  This leaves a critical problem if “treason” is the right description of what occurred: is Russia an enemy of the United States?

Aiding a foreign power may violate some other law, but it is not “treason” unless the aid is given with an intent to betray the United States and the foreign power is an “enemy.”  My current research is exploring this problem, though I confess that when I began exploring it, I did so in the context of the Islamic State and al Qaeda, wondering whether the original understanding of “enemy” in the Treason Clause included non-state actors or those against whom no formal declaration of war has been issued.  We have not formally declared war against ISIL.  Indeed, we have not even debated (much less passed) a new authorization for the use of force to target ISIL (we should do that).  But we have engaged in hostile action against ISIL, and it has engaged in hostile action against us.  Perhaps that is enough to make ISIL an “enemy” and to prosecute for treason those with allegiance to us who give aid and comfort to ISIL.

But what about Russia?  We have had a diplomatic relationship with Russia (though that relationship has recently been a frosty one, it seems) and are not engaged in military violence or other hostilities against the Russians.  Yet senior American law enforcement, intelligence, and military leaders confirm that Russia is an “adversary” of the United States.  Defense Secretary James Mattis made such an observation earlier this year (see here), before he joined the cabinet.  Just this past week, at the House Intelligence Committee hearing during which FBI Director James Comey and NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers testified, both men acknowledged that Russia is an adversary of the United States.  The critical question for purposes of the Treason Clause, though, is whether an “adversary” is the same thing as an “enemy.”

The modern dictionary makes these two words synonyms, as does Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 (see here). But does the Constitution?  Are armed hostilities necessary to make a foreign power an “enemy”?  Does the Constitution account for the modern ways in which non-violent action by a foreign power can corrupt and harm American persons and institutions?  Perhaps this is an example of how the original public meaning of a word, as of 1787, can still apply to contemporary problems.

I sympathize with those wishing to further explore the Trump campaign’s relationships with the Russian government, or with private individuals working under the influence of the Russian government.  I also think such an investigation should fully explore the intelligence, military, diplomatic, and criminal law consequences of any such relationships that are uncovered.  Of course, maybe there is no there there.  But even if there is, whether such conduct would constitute treason depends upon satisfying the constitutionally-defined elements of that offense.  To make it treason, we must be prepared to identify Russia not just as an adversary, but as an “enemy,” as that term is understood not just in common parlance but in the Constitution.  I suspect that many Americans and American political leaders are prepared to say this.  But is the Trump Administration?

 

Would the Speech or Debate Clause protect a sitting Senator in confirmation hearings for a Cabinet post?

With the news that at least one poll shows a majority of Americans believe that Attorney General Jeff Sessions committed perjury and should resign, the question of General Sessions’s criminality has not yet entirely died, though it has weakened significantly since the President’s tweet about being “wiretapped” by President Obama.  As I explained previously here, I am confident that no prosecution will result.  Still, the lingering question about whether he lied to Congress and what his answers meant raises — as I mentioned last time — another interesting issue: because he was a United States Senator when he met with the Russian Ambassador, and when he testified at his confirmation hearings, would the Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, section 6 protect him from prosecution arising from his confirmation testimony?

To be clear, I think he is safe from prosecution, but for other reasons.  So here is my admittedly quick and ugly Speech or Debate Clause analysis.  Steven Calabresi has a very good piece here at The Hill, and Michael Stern has a characteristically thoughtful piece here at Point of Order.  I could be wrong about this particular constitutional problem, so, as always, I welcome other wisdom.

The Speech or Debate Clause says that for “any Speech or Debate in either House,” a Representative or Senator “shall not be questioned in any other place.”  It covers more than floor speeches, but it only protects “legitimate legislative activity,” according to the Supreme Court.  Activities beyond floor speeches, “must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes” by which Senators and representatives fulfill their constitutional functions.  See Hutchinson v. Proxmire.  It is arguable that when then-Senator Sessions met with the Russian Ambassador in Cleveland, this was not a legislative act protected by the Clause.  That, of course, might depend upon what they discussed, which we do not know.  But a stronger argument exists that the meeting in Sessions’s Senate office was covered by the Speech or Debate Clause to the extent that it related to his work on the Armed Services Committee or otherwise to American foreign policy.  Of course, as the Court said in Gravel v. United States, not every act that is performed by a Senator or Representative, even in his official capacity, is a protected act.  See also United States v. Brewster.  But let us assume for the sake of this piece that each meeting was within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity covered by Article I, section 6.

Then there is the question of his testimony: would his testimony before the Judiciary Committee be protected?  I think not, because his testimony before the committee did not constitute an integral part of his legislative functions as a Senator.  So while his questioners would be protected because they were fulfilling their constitutional role of advice and consent, Sessions’s statements before committee were unrelated to his constitutional role as a Senator and therefore not “legitimate legislative acts.”

So here’s the problem: the Sessions controversy does not concern a prosecution for the meetings themselves; it concerns his testimony about those meetings.  Could it be, then, that as long as an activity is within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, a Representative or Senator does not have to truthfully answer questions about that activity under oath in a congressional committee?

It’s a complicated issue.  First, the Clause is essentially a separation of powers provision.  It protects the legislative branch against vindictive or abusive prosecutions by the executive branch.  See Gravel.  It also constitutionalizes a testimonial privilege, id., so that even the judiciary cannot compel a Senator or Representative to give over testimony or evidence arising from his or her legitimate legislative acts.  But in the Sessions case, the questioning was not done by the other branches.  It was done by the Senate itself.  Not only do the words “any other place” suggest that the Clause does not forbid questioning by the legislative branch, the separation of powers concerns underlying the Clause also suggest that the Clause should be read to limit only the executive and judicial branches from questioning members of Congress.

So one plausible reading of the Clause, based on both text and history, is that it does not forbid a Senator from questioning another Senator about his or her legislative acts and using those answers as a ground for decision-making.

This raises the next problem: while it is true that the initial questioning was done by the legislative branch, a perjury or false statements prosecution would be done by the executive, and would use his answers about a legislative act as evidence.  Is that forbidden?  This is much trickier.

The Court has said that the Clause would be undermined by admitting against a Senator or Representative evidence that references a past legislative act.  See United States v. Helstoski.  Still, if my premise above is correct, then one could argue that the evidence of Sessions’s alleged criminality derives from a proceeding in which he lacked the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.  Again, using this line of argument, he had no testimonial privilege under the Clause when answering either Senator Franken’s question or Senator Leahy’s.  Therefore, on this line of argument, his answers to those questions — quite apart from the substance of his meetings with the Ambassador —  should be admissible against him.  I confess, though, this is a harder problem because it means using evidence (his testimony) concerning a presumptively (for these purposes) legislative act, which the Supreme Court has expressly forbidden.  If his meetings with the ambassador were legislative acts, then there is a good chance, as others have argued, that the Clause would forbid the Justice Department from using any evidence about those meetings, even derivative use.

A final question arises, though it is a different one than I have addressed above: can the Speech or Debate Clause protection be waived?  If his activities were protected, did Sessions waive the privilege by voluntarily testifying about those activities?  The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, in Helstoski, that the Clause could be waived.  But the Court said even if a waiver is appropriate in this context, it requires “explicit and unequivocal renunciation” of the Clause’s protection.  See Helstoski (also describing the standard as “clear and unambiguous”).

In Attorney General Sessions’s case, if the above analysis is correct, it might be unnecessary to decide whether he waived the privilege because, at least in the Judiciary Committee, he did not have its protection in the first place (and thus there was nothing to waive).  But in an ordinary legal proceeding in which he was subject to questioning (under oath or not), or investigation, what would such a waiver look like?  Based on the language in Helstoski, it would seem not encompass implied waivers (such as in the Miranda context; in fact, the standard is more like invocation, rather than waiver, in the Miranda context).  So if, arguendo, Sessions had the protection of the Clause, merely agreeing to answer questions would not be adequate for a waiver of Speech or Debate protection.  He would have to offer a clear and unambiguous statement that he was not relying on the protections of Article I, section 6.

Still, the threshold question is the most important one: were Sessions’ meetings with the ambassador legitimate legislative acts?  To know that, in this context, we would have to have evidence of what was discussed.  Barring testimony from someone else, or some other evidence, it is almost as if, to establish protection under the Clause, Sessions would have to agree to reveal the substance of the meetings.  In other words, Sessions would have to agree to waive the Speech or Debate privilege in order to assert its protections.  To avoid this dilemma, it might be better to simply start with the presumption that the meetings were covered by the Clause — but nothing in the Supreme Court’s cases suggests that such a presumption applies to any and all acts by a sitting member of either house.

Again, this problem is of mostly academic interest, for now.  Still, given the frequency with which members of Congress are nominated for Administration posts, it is a problem worth considering in future confirmation hearings.

The Sessions controversy, or, why mens rea is so important in the criminal law

What had the potential to be a corner-turning week for the President was marred late Wednesday, and for the last few days, by revelations that Attorney General Jeff Sessions, while a Senator, met on two occasions with the Russian Ambassador during the 2016 election.  This was newsworthy because first, there is concern that perhaps Sessions had conversations about the campaign, the election, or a future Trump foreign policy; and second, Attorney General Sessions had claimed during his Senate testimony, and in written responses to questions, that he did not have any contact with Russian officials during the campaign.  While General Sessions has now recused himself from certain Russia-related investigations, some Democrats are calling for his resignation.  Others are saying he may have committed a crime.  Before Democrats savor the opportunity to chant “Lock Him Up!,” consider the applicable criminal laws more closely.

Is it a crime to give false or misleading testimony to a congressional committee?  Yes, and no.  Two statutes are relevant.  One is the general perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. 1621, which prohibits “willfully” giving a statement under oath that the witness “does not believe to be true.”  It is punishable by up to five years in prison.  The other statute is the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. 1001.  Section 1001 provides that whoever, “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch” of the federal Government “knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” or “makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry” commits an offense punishable by up to five years in prison.

So, to be precise, it is a crime to give a false statement to a congressional committee (whether or not under oath), but only where the statement is made knowingly and willfully.  Statements made with a faulty memory, or when the witness is confused about what is being asked, or that are simply mistaken, are not criminal.  See United States v. Dunnigan (with respect to perjury).  That is why the context and circumstances in which these statements are made matter a great deal, because they bear directly on Sessions’s state of mind and thus the mens rea elements of the statutes.

General Sessions appears now to be claiming that he believed that the questions he was asked referred only to whether he met with the Russian Ambassador about the campaign — that is, other than in his capacity as a Senator and a member of the Armed Services Committee.  General Sessions has claimed that he could not recall the substance of the conversations (strange, given the other details he seemed to remember; and if he cannot recall the substance of the conversation, how does he know he did not discuss the campaign or the election?).  Still, if his assertion now is made in good faith, that would likely be enough to negate the mens rea of the perjury and false statements statutes, meaning those provisions could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

That is probably the likely result here.  It is not unusual for a witness to give statements before a congressional committee, or during a government investigation, that may be misleading or incomplete.  Giving the witness an opportunity to walk back, and explain, the statement more fully should usually be sufficient to satisfy the investigating entity in Congress, unless some intervening harm has been done by the earlier statement (and that does not appear to be the case here).    It is therefore exceedingly rare that someone will be prosecuted for lying to Congress.  That is typically less true when applying section 1001 in the context of a criminal investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency, and section 1001 is often used as a basis for prosecution.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Brogan v. United States, section 1001’s text does not leave room for an “exculpatory no.”  Still, federal prosecutors must consider the strength and plausibility of the defendant’s explanation of what he believed he was being asked, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances.  And in many cases — including this one — the explanation will not be an implausible one.

One may not accept General Sessions’ after-the-fact explanation as being truthful, but if it is, he is not guilty of a crime.  Of course, there are two very distinct possible explanations here: is it that, at the time, Senator Sessions did not remember his meetings with the Ambassador, or that he remembered but did not think those meetings were covered by the questions asked?  Either explanation could serve as a basis for avoiding criminal liability.  But note that those are very different explanations, and both cannot be true.

One other issue has arisen, though it would be relevant only if we are seriously talking about a federal prosecution here (which, again, I think is highly unlikely).  Would then-Senator Sessions be protected in committee by the Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, section 6 of the Constitution?  More on that in a subsequent post.

It seems unlikely that Sessions is at the heart of the Russia-contacts controversy.  Making him a target may be satisfying to those who did not want him to be AG in the first place, but it likely will not yield much.  A better rabbit hole to explore might be this: did anyone in the campaign or the Trump transition instruct, command, induce, or request that staff and officials deny contacts with the Russians if they are ever asked?  If so, the range of potential criminality with in the Administration could greatly expand.  Will an investigation pursue that question?

Drug prosecutions in the Trump Administration

At one of this week’s White House press briefings, Sean Spicer spent considerable time (clearly more than he wished) discussing the President’s approach to federal drug policy.  This is one of the areas that I had previously flagged as representing a potentially meaningful departure from Obama Administration policy at the Justice Department.  Spicer’s briefing appeared to signal that this Administration would take a more aggressive approach to drug crime than its predecessor.  But that remains unclear.

Indeed, Spicer’s briefing may have created more new questions than it answered, which has become a rather predictable consequence of his briefings.  Notably, Spicer discussed an obscure appropriations rider (which I previously discussed here) that defunds federal prosecutions for drug offenses in states with liberal medicinal marijuana laws.  He distinguished — on no fewer than three occasions — recreational use from medicinal use, saying, with respect to federal drug enforcement relating to recreational use, “I do think you’ll see greater enforcement of it.”  Presumably, in context, he means greater enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act where the use is recreational.  Strangely, he subsequently tried to walk that statement back, instead referring the issue to the DOJ.

But the question now arises: will the Sessions DOJ more aggressively prosecute CSA offenses?  Will the Sessions DOJ reverse the Holder Memo from August 2013 that directed federal prosecutors not to allege drug quantities that trigger mandatory minimums if certain criteria are met?  That was a major pronouncement from Main Justice, and will have a meaningful effect on the way federal prosecutors treat drug crimes.  Yet the Administration has thus far been silent, and Spicer’s briefing did not help to clarify that matter.

Moreover, the rider to which he alluded does not cover every jurisdiction, because not every jurisdiction has liberal medical marijuana laws.  And it only applies where the defendant is in compliance with all of the State’s marijuana use laws.  This means that, potentially, a defendant who is in violation of the CSA, but who is using the marijuana for medicinal purposes in a state that is not covered by the rider (say, for example, West Virginia), could still be subject to prosecution.  Spicer did not seem to appreciate this scenario, and it raises the question: will the Administration prosecute those defendants?  If so, does that not obliterate the distinction between medicinal use and recreational use that Spicer had drawn?  Also, the rider is of limited duration; Congress could change it at any time.  What will the Administration’s position be on continuing the policy adopted by the rider?  Spicer did not say, but his distinction between recreational use and medicinal use would suggest that the Administration wants the rider to exist indefinitely.  Does Jeff Sessions?

Finally, Spicer was asked repeatedly about the Administration’s decision to reverse the Obama Administration’s interpretation of Title IX with respect to transgender bathroom access.  Spicer referred to this as a “states’ rights” issue (it is not, though that is a subject for another day), and said “we are a state’s rights party.”  I have said before that the use of the term “states’ rights” is constitutionally unsound, in my view, and that conservatives should not use it (“federalism” is a far better term, and is more accurate).  But if Spicer is correct that the Administration is committed to federalism, what, then, does that mean for federal drug law generally?  Of course, the CSA was upheld against a Commerce Clause challenge in Gonzales v. Raich, but two notable conservatives – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas – dissented in that case, as did Justice O’Connor (a notable defender of federalism and of state interests).  Why is drug law not a “states’ rights issue,” too?  By making the transgender bathroom issue one of federalism, Spicer has opened the door to questions about whether the Trump Administration is committed to federalism across subject matter, or whether its approach to Title IX is a kind of fair-weather federalism.

Sure, the appropriations rider is a federalism-protection measure.  But reference to the rider alone tells us nothing about the Administration’s view more broadly concerning the role of the federal government in making and enforcing criminal drug laws.  Perhaps more notably, Spicer’s responses raised this question: if federalism demands respecting the states that have chosen to make medicinal use legal, why does federalism not demand respecting those states that have chosen to make recreational use legal?  In other words, even if we grant the difference between recreational and medicinal use, does a true commitment to federalism require respect for state decisions as to both?

I’m no fan of more liberal drug laws.  There must be a robust drug policy regime that takes a variety of approaches — including, but not limited to, prosecutorial ones — to the range of drug problems in this country.  Spicer, of course, cannot be expected to answer at one briefing every question regarding the President’s views on these various problems.  But this Administration needs a coherent approach to both drug policy and constitutional federalism. And right now it has neither.

 

Suspected thief turns out to be felon in possession, but gun turns out to be inadmissible

Sometimes a federal gun possession crime results from an investigation specifically directed at the gun offense.  Sometimes, however, gun crimes result from investigations that have nothing to do with guns.  Just ask Phillip David Hernandez, who had an encounter with police as he walked next to a construction site that was located in a high-crime area and that was known for being the target of thieves interested in the construction materials there.  Did the police encounter turn up any stolen construction materials?  Nope.  It turned up a gun – which, as a convicted felon, Hernandez was not permitted to possess.  His case raises the question: was he “seized” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when police questioned him from their patrol vehicle as he walked near the construction site?  If not, then the gun is admissible against him because the encounter is a “consensual” one, and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.  But if it was a seizure, then the police have to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for the stop.  Can they?

According to the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Hernandez, in October 2014, Denver police spotted Hernandez walking next to the construction site.  He wore all black clothing and carried two backpacks.  The site had been the subject of recent thefts of various materials, including sheet metal and copper piping.  Police suspected Hernandez might be serving as a lookout for thieves, though there was no one else around.  The officers also found it odd that Hernandez did not use the sidewalk on the other side of the street, but instead walked next to the construction area, essentially in the street.

When the officers pulled alongside him, Hernandez kept walking, and the officers followed along in a moving vehicle.  They did not display weapons nor raise their voices.  When asked where he was going and where he had been, Hernandez said he was at his grandmother’s and was headed home.  He then said, upon being asked, that he could not remember his grandmother’s address.  When asked if he would stop walking and talk to the officers, Hernandez complied.  When asked, he gave his real name but a false birthdate.  The officers pulled up his information on their computer, and it showed Hernandez’s mug shot and that he had violated parole, for which there was an active warrant.  He was informed of the warrant and approached by the officers on foot, and he began to walk away.  He reached for his waistband and an officer asked if he had a gun.  He said “yes,” the officer grabbed his arm, and a revolver fell to the ground.

Hernandez was indicted for being a felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and filed a motion to suppress, which the district court granted.  The Government appealed.  The Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression of the gun.

Was Hernandez seized?  Yes, this was a seizure that required reasonable suspicion, according to the court.  While this began, as do many police encounters on the street, as a consensual encounter that required no justification, it became a seizure when the officers asked Hernandez to stop walking and talk to them.  This was the point at which a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter and continue on his way – considering that that it was dark, there were no other people around, and the request to stop was made by two uniformed officers who had been following him.  As the court put it, “a reasonable person would have believed that compliance with the ‘request’ was not optional.”

Now that we know he was seized, was there reasonable suspicion that would have justified the seizure?  No, the court said.  The police stop of Hernandez was, rather, based on “inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches,” the court wrote.  They had no evidence specific to Hernandez that he had committed any crime, and the mere fact that he was walking next to a location that had been the subject of previous criminal activity is not enough to make their suspicion of him reasonable.  Neither was the fact that he was in a “high-crime” area, or that he wore all black and had two backpacks, or that he chose not to use the sidewalk.

What about the fact that he could not recall his grandmother’s address?  The court found that the Government had not relied upon this argument previously, and should not be able to rely upon it now on appeal.  Still, that fact would not be entitled to much weight, the court said.  When each officer testified, neither relied upon this fact to establish their suspicions about Hernandez, “which,” the court said, “is understandable because ordinary experience tells us that a grandchild who knows the familiar way to his grandmother’s house may well not know her exact street address.”

A final aspect of this case is notable.  Could the Government have argued that the finding of the gun was sufficiently attenuated from the initial unlawful stop, given the existence of the active warrant for Hernandez, a la Utah v. Strieff?  Recall that in Strieff, the Court applied the attenuation doctrine to hold that the discovery of an untainted warrant breaks the link to an unlawful Terry stop.  As it happens, Strieff was decided after briefing and argument in Hernandez.  But the Government never relied on attenuation in the district court, and so had waived that argument on appeal.  Before Strieff had been decided, the Tenth Circuit noted, two other circuits followed the same rule that was ultimately recognized by the Supreme Court in Strieff.  So the attenuation argument was available to the Government, but the Government did not pursue it.

Query whether, had the attenuation argument been properly before the Tenth Circuit, Strieff would make the gun admissible.  Applying the Brown factors, as did Strieff, the Government would have had a persuasive argument that the discovery of the warrant here was an intervening circumstance that makes the gun admissible.

“Send in the Feds”? Don’t bother, they’re here.

Keeping up with President Trump’s Twitter activity is a full-time job, and I don’t have that kind of time.  So I rarely find it useful to comment on any of his Tweets.  I could not, however, resist responding to one from late last night, in which he makes a statement about the violence plaguing Chicago: “If Chicago doesn’t fix the horrible ‘carnage’ going on . . . I will send in the Feds!”

What does that even mean?

Chicago – a great American city by any definition – is home to a busy United States Attorneys Office, and field offices for the FBI, DEA, and ATF, among others.  Federal prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel in Chicagoland – among the brightest and most talented in the Nation – routinely work on violent criminal cases within federal jurisdiction.  Even a cursory look at the press releases for these federal offices shows that they have been busy using federal resources to fight Chicago’s dire crime problem (which seems connected in substantial part to a drug trafficking and gang problem).  See, e.g., here, and here, and here, and here, and here, and here.

In other words, what kind of federal role in Chicago does President Trump envision that does not already exist there?

One possibility is that he is not talking about policing and prosecution at all, but rather is talking about using National Guard troops.  That would raise serious legal issues, if the troops are called upon to engage in civilian law enforcement.  The image of uniformed military and even of military weaponry constantly patrolling Chicago’s streets is not an image of America becoming great again.  Another possibility is that he is talking about sending more federal money or other resources to Chicago to help combat the problem.  That would be welcome news to city and state officials in Chicago, I imagine (see a Chicago Tribune piece here).  But that is not typically what one would think of when hearing “send in the Feds,” a phrase that suggests a substantial physical presence by federal officials.  Perhaps even more agents and AUSAs could be placed there; perhaps federal drug and gang task forces there could be enhanced and better funded.  I would favor that move.  But let’s be clear: that’s not sending in the feds – that’s sending in more Feds.

Finally, while there is certainly a robust federal law enforcement role where the violent criminal activity involves guns, gangs, and/or drugs, does the President believe that the federal government should supplant the role of city and state officials in ordinary law enforcement involving street crime merely because the city and state are failing to curb the crime rate?  It is true that federal criminal law offers an expansive role for the Feds in this regard, but a more expensive role for the federal government is not something that conservatives and Republicans have typically defended, preferring instead that most criminal law enforcement be done at the state and local levels.  I can’t imagine intellectually honest conservatives going along with the idea of a wholesale federalization of criminal law enforcement in a major American city.

So if the President simply means ensuring a federal role in cooperation with the city and state role, then I must ask again: how is that different from the existing situation?

The President’s Tweet therefore raise two distinct questions.  First, is he even aware of, or does he understand, the rather extensive law enforcement role of the federal government in Chicago already?  And second, how does he envision the federal role there – or in other cities – in the scheme of constitutional federalism?

Unlike others who have been critical of the President’s focus on crime, I applaud the President for tackling this issue at a time when “criminal justice reform” rhetoric has often obscured a discussion of the need for aggressive approaches to criminal violence (including gun violence and drug trafficking, two things that often go together and that are plaguing Chicago).  And there is no question that the federal criminal law provides legal mechanisms for an aggressive federal approach to the kinds of violent crime that Chicago has been experiencing.  But those mechanisms are already at work in Chicago.  Maybe they should be even more robust.  But perhaps the President could be clearer about his federal prosecutorial priorities and his understanding of the Constitution’s limits on enforcing them.

Transgender killing results in federal hate crime conviction

Several of my recent posts have addressed issues related to hate crimes.  Obviously, the Roof conviction and upcoming federal death penalty hearing has made that case the leading hate crime story nationally of late.  But it seems helpful to note the latest hate crime story of interest, also from the deep South.  Like others, it raises important questions about the federal role in prosecuting violent crimes committed with a bias-motivation.  As the Justice Department announced here, a Mississippi man yesterday pleaded guilty to brutally killing his former romantic partner because she was transgender, and in order to avoid the wrath of a violent street gang.

According to the DOJ and the defendant’s statements at the plea hearing, Joshua Vallum had been dating Mercedes Williamson, then 17.  Vallum knew that Williamson was transgender but he kept this a secret from his family and friends.  Vallum was also a member of the Latin Kings.  The relationship ended and for about nine months, Vallum had no contact with Williamson.  Vallum learned, however, that one of his friends found out that Williamson was transgender.  Believing that he would be harmed if the Latin Kings also discovered that he had been dating a transgender person (the gang has strict rules about homosexuality, and Williamson’s birth gender was male), Vallum decided to kill Williamson.

After driving her from Alabama to Mississippi, he shocked her with a stun gun, and stabbed her repeatedly with a pocket knife.  Williamson was able to escape from the car where Vallum had stabbed her, but Vallum gave chase and stabbed her again in the head (he believed he had “hit brain”).  Although Williamson was still able to stumble into some woods, Vallum again caught up to her and hit her repeatedly with a hammer, killing her.

This case gained special national prominence after Caitlyn Jenner remembered Williamson during Jenner’s 2015 speech at the ESPY awards.

Vallum had already been convicted in Mississippi state court of murder and received a life sentence.  But, as has been true in other cases, the Feds believed that it was necessary to pursue a federal prosecution because Mississippi does not have a hate crimes statute for which gender identity is a protected category.  Thus, in the language of both the relevant statute (the Shepard-Byrd Act, 18 U.S.C. 249) and the DOJ’s Petite Policy, the state prosecution left the specific federal interest “unvindicated.”  It is an open question whether the Trump Administration will take a similar view of how federal interests become vindicated by state prosecutions.

Vallum now faces another life sentence, this time in the federal system.  As I have discussed elsewhere, there is no death penalty under the Shepard-Byrd Act, though I believe this case and others demonstrate why there ought to at least be that option for federal juries in section 249 cases involving brutal killings like this one.

But that raises another question: why not also charge Vallum with murder in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. 1959)?  The VICAR statute reaches murder committed for the purpose of “maintaining or increasing position” in a racketeering enterprise.  If the Government’s theory is that Vallum killed Williamson not simply to avoid harm by the Latin Kings (surely a “racketeering enterprise” as defined in VICAR), but in order to remain a member of the Latin Kings, then this would seem to provide sufficient evidence to charge the VICAR offense.  That is notable because a killing under VICAR – unlike the Shepard-Byrd Act – does permit the death penalty.

I have not seen the Vallum indictment.  Perhaps it does contain a VICAR charge, and that charge was dismissed as part of the plea agreement to the hate crime.  If it was not included, perhaps the theory would be that Vallum committed the killing not on behalf of the Latin Kings, or because of a desire to maintain his position in the Latin Kings, but only because of Williamson’s gender identity and his fear of the gang’s enforcement.  But it seems hard to neatly separate his killing of Williamson on account of her gender identity from his interest in maintaining a place within the gang – arguably, he did one to preserve the other.  And that is precisely what VICAR forbids.

Finally, because this prosecution was based on section 249(a)(2), which is justified only under the Commerce Clause, there is a reasonable question as to whether the federal government properly had jurisdiction in the case.  But the statute easily answers that problem, at least as a matter of statutory application.  It specifically permits federal jurisdiction where there was travel across state lines, see 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(2)(B)(i)(I), and that was the case here.  Perhaps Vallum could have argued that the travel from Alabama to Mississippi was too attenuated from the killing to be justified under the Commerce Clause, but I doubt such an argument would go very far.  The statute also permits federal jurisdiction where the defendant uses a dangerous weapon or other weapon that has traveled in interstate commerce, or where the defendant used a “channel, facility, or instrumentality” of commerce “in connection with” the prohibited conduct, or where the prohibited conduct otherwise affects commerce.  See 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv).

Still, in a different case, depending upon the facts, it could make sense to question whether some of these jurisdictional elements are enough to satisfy the Commerce Clause.  Watch for a hate crime case presenting a viable challenge to the jurisdictional element and the scope of congressional power.